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Dams, Development and the Future of Sino-Indian Hydro-Politics 
By Ronni Ravid 
 
Abstract  
China and India's miraculous economic growth has improved the livelihoods of millions 
of people but has increased demand for already scarce water resources in the region. The hydro-
political relationship between the two states is unique due to China’s hold of the Tibetan Plateau, 
which houses nearly all major riverheads in the region. China’s unwillingness to cooperate with 
their downstream neighbors has become cause for concern, especially for India’s growing 
economy and population. Water, most obviously crucial for public health, is also a key input for 
all energy production, making it imperative to the continued development of both states. This 
study holistically analyzes key economic policy changes enacted by both states in the late 20th 
century that encouraged their rapid economic growth and proceeds to quantitatively assess the 
associated changes in energy and water demand. This analysis is supported by modern water 
scarcity data and contextualized through the lens of the geopolitics of Tibet. Utilizing Fearon’s 
rationalist framework, I analyze the key sources of conflict as incomplete information and 
commitment problems exacerbated by the indivisible nature of the Tibet’s resources. The 
interconnections between these sources make finding a comprehensive solution difficult. I 
suggest that domestic water and energy efficiency improvements and codified data sharing 
agreements can foment short-term cooperation between the nations. This thesis ultimately 
establishes a link between China and India’s globalization-led development and the associated 
change in energy and water demand in order to determine the actions necessary to avoid 
international conflict and ensure long-term water and energy security for both states. 
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I. Introduction 
The phrase “water is life” has been circulated and translated throughout the world for 
decades. The phrase, though simple, evokes the absolutely irrefutable and unquantifiable value 
of water. Most obviously we need water to satisfy our thirst and cultivate crops, but as the world 
rapidly developed, water became a crucial economic input for many industries.1 From textile 
production to steel smelting, water is an irreplaceable production input. Basic economic 
principles tell us that in order to capture returns to scale, the total production input must 
increase.2 Water is not only crucial to the production of goods as an input, but also plays an 
increasingly crucial role in energy production as well.3 Throughout our historical development 
water has played a key role in all aspects of life and the 21st century is no exception. More than 
ever before, water is becoming a global issue that demands attention as impacts of climate 
change, pollution and increased consumption exacerbate existing issues of water scarcity. 
Among the world’s emerging water antagonisms, one in particular necessitates immediate 
attention. China and India’s miraculous economic growth since the late 20th has changed the 
livelihoods of hundreds of millions of people.4 As the two most populous countries in the world, 
China and India must consider and mitigate prevailing issues related to increased domestic 
consumption of natural resources.  
                                            
1 Thompson, B. (2017). Water as a Public Commodity. Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and 
Policy, 12(2), 247–263. https://doi.org/10.3366/ajicl.2011.0005 
2 Silberston, A. (1972). Economies of Scale in Theory and Practice. The Economic Journal, 82. Retrieved from 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2229943.pdf 
3 Yu Qiu, G., Li, W., Li, L., Zhang, Q., & Yang, Y. (2014). Water and Energy Nexus in China: Current Situation 
and Future Perspective in Energy Industry, Water Industry and Agriculture. https://doi.org/10.4172/2090-
4541.1000138 
4 Barry, N. (1993). Deng Xiaoping: The Economist. The China Quarterly, (135), 491–514. Retrieved from 
https://about.jstor.org/terms 
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An influx of foreign money flowed into China’s borders as the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) eased its economic oversight in the early 1980s,5 and as a result, the country’s industrial 
and consumption-related water demands changed.6 Both production-related demand (agriculture 
and industry) as well as consumption-related demand (urban and rural households) have 
increased since the 1980s.7 These rising demands have mandated the CCP undertake massive 
infrastructural projects to irrigate water from the water-rich provinces of the south to the water-
scarce provinces of the north.8 How China chooses to mitigate its increased water consumption 
will directly impact its regional neighbors—most importantly, its regional rival India. 
China’s water consumption changes are crucial to regional hydro-politics due its control of 
the Tibetan Plateau. Touted as “Asia’s water tower,” the Tibetan Plateau is home to ten major 
riverheads that provide water to 50% of the world’s population.9 If China pursues water projects 
upstream in Tibet, their downstream neighbors could be heavily impacted. As China encounters 
continued water scarcity issues, the CCP will have greater incentive to pursue water projects 
involving the waters of the Tibetan Plateau.10 The region as a whole, from Bangladesh to 
Vietnam, is experiencing remarkable economic growth. But economic development carries a 
                                            
5 Ibid. 
6 Shalizi, Z. (2008). Water and Urbanization. In China Urbanizes: Consequences, Strategies and Policies. 
Washington DC: The World Bank. Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/swm_cities_zaragoza_2010/pdf/03_water_and_urbanisation.pdf 
7 Yu Qiu, G., Li, W., Li, L., Zhang, Q., & Yang, Y. (2014). Water and Energy Nexus in China: Current Situation 
and Future Perspective in Energy Industry, Water Industry and Agriculture. https://doi.org/10.4172/2090-
4541.1000138 
8 Shahid, Y., & Saich, T. (2008). China Urbanizes: Consequences, Strategies, and Policies. The World 
Bank/International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Retrieved from 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6337/424850PUB0ISBN101OFFICIAL0USE0
ONLY1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
9 Pomeranz, K. (2013). Asia’s Unstable Water Tower: The Politics, Economics, and Ecology of Himalayan Water 
Projects. Asia Policy, 10(16), 4–10. https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2013.0023 
10 Ibid. 
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heavy burden on natural resources, namely water. As these nations develop their water demands 
will also increase, deeming water-sharing a pressing international issue.  
India and China’s water relationship is of particularly high concern. As two of the largest 
nations in the world in terms of population and economic output, the outcome of hydro-political 
disputes is a globally meaningful issue. Though China’s economic and population growth has 
slowed over time, the country’s consumption needs are still steadily increasing.11 India, 
conversely, is about a decade behind China in terms of economic development. India’s economy 
and population has been growing rapidly since the early 1990s and shows no sign of slowing.12 
As India continues to capture its developmental potential, its water needs will change.13 India is 
already experiencing water shortages throughout the country and risks retarding its economic 
growth if long-term water access is not ensured.14 India and China alike are becoming 
increasingly incentivized to capitalize on their domestic water sources; but due to the geography 
of the region and the importance of the Tibetan Plateau, their pursuit of domestic satiation has 
international implications. The Tibet Plateau acts as the meeting point for Sino-Indian economic, 
political and security related issues. Without proper attention, the Sino-Indian hydro-political 
issue will continue to fester and increase its likelihood of escalation into conflict. 
The hydro-political issues brewing in the region have attracted large amounts of 
academic and public attention. Growing concern for future “water wars” has made the Sino-
Indian water situation highly politicized15 because of the economic importance of adequate water 
                                            
11 FAO. 2016. AQUASTAT Main Database, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 
12 Ibid. 
13 Bhatnagar, M. (2009). Reconsidering the Indus Waters Treaty. Tulane Environmental Law Journal, 22, 271–461. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Chellaney, Brahma China’s New War Front: Natural Resource as a Political Tool, (Times of India, 2013) 
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access for the public and private spheres grows domestically in India and China alike.16 India 
risks forfeiting its economic rise if its needs are not met. Institutions like the United Nations and 
World Bank have historically played a key role in brokering bilateral water agreements,17 but 
China’s uncooperative nature in regard to water treaties obstructs any potential treaty. The 
multifaceted value of water makes it a particularly hard resource to manage. But as economic 
and urban development spreads throughout Southeast Asia demand for water will become an 
increasingly pressing and global issue that will demand sustainable management. 18   
This thesis aims to link the globalization-led economic development of India and China 
beginning in the late 20th century to the prevailing regional water issues today in order to discuss 
potential escalation and methods for de-escalation. The thesis distinguishes itself in its attempt to 
combine historical, political and economic analysis to understand the complexity of these issues 
bilaterally. Water issues in India and China have been studied independently, but a critical 
connection between their economic development narratives to modern bilateral water issues is 
necessary to understand the full potential for conflict and cooperation.  
I will be utilizing an interdisciplinary method of analysis to establish and discuss the 
issue at hand. The first section details the development narratives of India and China by utilizing 
statistical data combined with qualitative policy analysis to demonstrate the process of rapid 
development of each state. The second section aims to demonstrate how the development 
narrative established in the preceding section has impacted water and energy consumption 
                                            
16 Yu Qiu, G., Li, W., Li, L., Zhang, Q., & Yang, Y. (2014). Water and Energy Nexus in China: Current Situation 
and Future Perspective in Energy Industry, Water Industry and Agriculture. https://doi.org/10.4172/2090-
4541.1000138 
17Bhatnagar, M. (2009). Reconsidering the Indus Waters Treaty. Tulane Environmental Law Journal, 22, 271–461. 
Radosevich, G. E., & Olson, D. C. (1999). Existing and Emerging Basin Arrangements in Asia: Mekong River 
Commission Case Study. The World Bank, 1–30. 
18 Thompson, B. (2017). Water as a Public Commodity. Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and 
Policy, 12(2), 247–263. https://doi.org/10.3366/ajicl.2011.0005 
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through a holistic analyzation of the data. The third section will explain the geopolitical 
relationship through an analysis of the territorial value of Tibet. The final section will utilize a 
rational choice framework to discuss the potential for conflict versus cooperation. Ultimately, I 
conclude that although escalation to conflict is a very real possibility, domestic and bilateral 
actions can help assuage problems of incomplete information, credible commitment and 
indivisibility to foment long-term cooperation between India and China. 
 
II. China and India’s Miraculous Development  
China and India are both in the process of rapid development, albeit at different stages. 
China experienced rapid economic growth beginning in the early 1980s and has since 
transformed as a nation. India is in the midst of rapid development with over a 7% GDP average 
growth between 2010 and 2018.19 Both countries utilized similar strategies like decreased 
bureaucratization and industrial regulation as well as the encouragement of private enterprise 
ownership in order to lift themselves from the low-income country bracket. Though the countries 
utilized similar ideologies for their policy changes, they ultimately aimed to encourage the 
growth of different sectors. Whereas China aimed to increase its manufacturing capacity, India 
poured its resources into the development of their service industry. 
 
2.1: China 1980 to Today: Key Policy Changes and Their Impact 
After Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, the CCP began to relax its hawkish governing style.20 
China’s era of fast paced economic development was spearheaded by Deng Xiaoping who 
                                            
19 World Bank. "Average GDP Growth Rate India (annual %)" World Development Indicators, The World Bank 
Group, 2017, data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC. 
20 Barry, N. (1993). Deng Xiaoping: The Economist. The China Quarterly, (135), 491–514. Retrieved from 
https://about.jstor.org/terms 
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focused on pragmatic and practical policy, rather than Maoist ideology. Deng ushered in a period 
of relaxed CCP economic policy that allowed foreign money to flow into China, increase 
personal wealth and improve the livelihoods of millions of people. Chinese economic reform 
began at the CCP’s Third Plenary Session in 1978. This meeting shifted the CCP’s economic 
policy to focus on market openness, the adoption of foreign advanced technologies and the 
encouragement of scientific and technological development in China. These major shifts in 
economic policy jump-started China’s rapid economic growth and importance to the world 
market. These decisions altered China’s role in the global market and gained it a seat at the 
economic table. 
The overarching theme of 1980s policy changes was relaxation. By relaxing its authority, 
the CCP gave the Chinese economy room to grow. The 1980s also marked a shift in the strategy 
of policy changes themselves. The CCP recognized that overzealous and impractically massive 
economic reforms were unsustainable and instead began implementing policy incrementally.21 
The most impactful changes encouraged by Deng were renewed emphasis on science and 
technology, allowance of individual wealth and encouragement of foreign investment.  
 
2.1.2: Emphasis on Science, Technology and Education 
Among the most important policy changes brought by Deng Xiaoping was his explicit 
belief in the value of science and technology. Deng Xiaoping recognized the importance of 
increasing production to improve the livelihoods of Chinese citizens and grow the economy. In 
order to increase production, scientific and technological capabilities would have to be improved.  
                                            
21 Ibid. 
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Prior to his rise to power, the Chinese education system had become highly politicized and 
lacked creative purpose.22 In order to encourage innovation, Deng Xiaoping relaxed the 
education system to allow more political freedom. Deng needed to depoliticize education and 
allow greater creative liberation in order to encourage the innovation needed to compete in the 
global market. Increasing the importance of education was a means to reaching this economic 
goal. By adopting technologies from abroad and encouraging the innovation of new practices, 
the CCP was able to increase productivity in agriculture and industry.23  
 
2.1.2: Rise of Wealth 
Though Deng Xiaoping maintained a strong appraisal of equity during his reign as party 
chairman, he also recognized the importance of allowing the accumulation of some personal 
wealth to encourage economic growth. To accomplish this aim, the CCP had to grant more 
liberty to the agricultural sector and thus established household responsibility systems (HRS). 
The HRS system distinguished itself in two ways: (1) the CCP began allowing farmers to 
privately sell their crops in small markets and (2) the CCP allowed resource ownership through 
land leases given to rural households.24 By giving families individual responsibility for their 
farming output and encouraging private market participation, millions of households lifted 
themselves out of poverty and increase the overall productivity of the sector. 
Following the increase in agricultural productivity, large amounts of rural labor were now 
available. This HRS policy was widely successful and in 1984 the CCP announced the policy’s 
                                            
22 Barry, N. (1993). Deng Xiaoping: The Economist. The China Quarterly, (135), 491–514. Retrieved from 
https://about.jstor.org/terms 
23 Cheremukhin, A., Golosov, M., Guriev, S., & Tsyvinski, A. (2015). The Economy of People’s Republic of China 
from 1953 (No. 21397). Cambridge, MA. 
24 Ibid. 
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extension to the whole economy, including the budding urban industry.25 The CCP introduced 
two major policy reforms to the state-owned industrial sector: (1) a dual-pricing system meant to 
encourage the rise of the planned and non-planned economy and (2) a contract management 
responsibility system (CMRS) that allowed enterprises to retain more profit and increase 
wages.26 These policy changes were also widely successful and in the mid 1990s, the CCP began 
allowing limited privatization of industries. In time the importance of state-owned enterprises 
decreased, ushering in the rise of privately-owned industries and the influx of foreign investment 
that ultimately led to huge increases in industrial production.27  
Between 1978 and 2012, the majority of China’s GDP growth was attributed the expansion 
of non-agricultural sectors.28 Agriculture lost its importance to the Chinese economy due the 
CCP’s goal of increasing the urban industrial sector. Throughout the 1980s, investments in 
agricultural infrastructure were redirected to urban infrastructure and policy increasingly focused 
on urban centers.  
But the CCP did not simply change the internal organization of China’s economy. It also 
facilitated China’s entrance into the world market through a new “open door” economic policy. 
This goal was accomplished through the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). SEZs 
were “designated geographical spaces where special policies and measure support specific 
economic functions” located along the Chinese coast to encourage foreign investments and 
leverage their geographic advantage. Different SEZs held different functions but all sought to 
                                            
25 Tisdell, C. (2008). Thirty Years of Economic Reform and Openness in China: Retrospect and Prospect (No. 51). 
Brisbane. Retrieved from https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/90620/files/WP 51.pdf 
26 Cheremukhin, A., Golosov, M., Guriev, S., & Tsyvinski, A. (2015). The Economy of People’s Republic of China 
from 1953 (No. 21397). Cambridge, MA. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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encourage foreign investment by providing some sort of propriety advantage. These advantages 
included free trade areas, industry parks and bonded zones.29 
  
 
2.1.3: Impact in China Today 
China’s modern economic growth has been called miraculous, and rightly so. In less that 50 
years China recovered from the deadliest famine in history and emerged as an economic 
powerhouse. Today, China acts as the US’s greatest competitor and as a linchpin in the global 
market. Demonstrated by Figure 1, China did not experience linear economic growth, but rather 
a more sudden jumpstart. Beginning in the mid 1990s China’s GDP per Capita rapidly rose and 
so did its power in the global market. This was due in large part the policy reforms enacted by 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) throughout the late 20th century to modernize China and 
facilitate economic growth. Looking back, these reforms have lifted millions of Chinese citizens 
out of poverty and have vastly altered the quality of life for the average Chinese.  
                                            
29 Chinese Special Economic. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Event/Africa/Investing in Africa Forum/2015/investing-
in-africa-forum-chinas-special-economic-zone.pdf 
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Figure 1: China GDP Per Capita 1975-2015 
Source: AQUASTAT Main Database, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 2016 
 
China did not just change economically; it changed demographically. The Chinese 
population has increased significantly since the mid 1970s, growing approximately 32%.30 But 
China’s population has not only changed in sheer numbers, it has also changed in geographic 
distribution. The economic growth captured by China encouraged the rapid urbanization of its 
cities as the CCP increasingly invested in urban industrial development.31 Between 1980 and 
2015 nearly 300 million rural Chinese citizens migrated into cities and some projections estimate 
that over 60% of the Chinese population will live in urban areas by 2020.32 
 The rapid urbanization in China is part of the prevailing international trend of the 
economic importance of cities. Unlike other rapidly urbanizing countries, China’s stringent 
                                            
30China, Zhongguo tong ji xin xi zi xun fu wu zhong xin, International Centre for the Advancement of Science & 
Technology, and University of Illinois at Chicago. 2018. China statistical yearbook. Hong Kong: International 
Centre for the Advancement of Science & Technology. 
31 Cheremukhin, A., Golosov, M., Guriev, S., & Tsyvinski, A. (2015). The Economy of People’s Republic of China 
from 1953 (No. 21397). Cambridge, MA. 
32 Yusuf, S., & Saich, A. (Eds.). (2008). China Urbanizes. The World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-
7211-1 
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internal migration ensured that the employment needs of growing industries are met without the 
rise of slums. Controlling the rural to urban migration was crucial to the CCP because “urban 
employment opportunities and the median urban wage will determine living standards in 
cities”33. As urban industries rapidly grew, the CCP began allowing more rural to urban 
migration to ensure that employment needs were met.  
 
2.2: India 1990 and Beyond: Key Policy Changes and Their Impact 
Since the late 1990s, India’s economy and population has experienced drastic yet volatile 
growth. Unlike China’s gradual and incremental process of increased trade openness and 
decreased bureaucratization, India’s groundbreaking economic growth can largely be attributed 
to a series of policy reforms enacted in 1991. After a balance of payments crisis in the late 1980s 
caused by import substitution economic strategy, India began following export-led economic 
development methods that mirrored those of China. This method, similar to Deng’s policies in 
China, subordinated the alleviation of poverty and decreased the role of the state in order to 
create the best environment for economic growth in the international market. Understanding the 
similarity of policy utilized by both states provides a good basis for future projections of Indian 
growth. 
The delay in policy reformation as compared to China explains the staggered economic 
growth between the two nations. In the years to come, India may follow the same rapid growth 
path as China which will have massive impacts on the natural resource needs of the country. 
Similar to its neighbor to the north, India changed its economic policy to encourage Foreign 
Direct Investment through decreased regulation, shrinking of the public sector and a switch to a 
                                            
33 Ibid. 
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floating exchange rate system. The key difference between China and India’s growth, however, 
is the sector of focus. Whereas China made huge attempts to increase their industrial 
productivity, India utilized its advantage to build its service sector.34  
 
2.2.1: Removing Industrial Regulations 
In order to encourage economic growth via export-led industrialization, India needed to 
reduce regulations to encourage international investment. The Indian government recognized its 
advantage as a massive and largely untapped market and therefore changed regulation to 
encourage economic interest by major international economic players. Tariffs played a major 
role in encouraging new international interest. In 1991 tariffs were reduced from an average of 
100% to approximately 30%.35 The Indian government also eliminated almost all quota ratios 
that inhibited international companies from capitalizing on the Indian market.  
The Indian government also began streamlining the industrial process though the 
elimination of the tedious and overly bureaucratic licensing system. The removal of licensing 
allowed larger, more efficient plants to enter the previously protected small-scale sectors36. The 
streamlining of the industrial investment system also eased the process of foreign investment, 
encouraging large amount of foreign investment in these newly opened sectors. 
 The decreasing in licensing points to the decreasing role of the government in planning 
the economy. By allowing the economy to be more independently regulated, the Indian 
government could allow the overall productivity of the private sector to increase. The decrease of 
licensing can also be seen as a relaxation of government oversight. 
                                            
34 Kumar, U., & Subramanian, A. (2011). India’s Growth in the 2000s: Four Facts. Washington DC. 
35 Agarwal, M., & Whalley, J. (2013). The 1991 Reforms, Indian Economic Growth, and Social Progress (No. 
19024). Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from https://www.nber.org/papers/w19024.pdf 
36 Ibid. 
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2.2.2: The Rise of the Service Sector 
 A major shift in Indian economic policy in the 1990s is the abandonment of a fixed 
exchange rate and the increase of available capital flows in the country. The switch from a fixed 
to a floating rate system allowed Indian exports to be more competitive in market through the 
devaluation of Indian currency37. The devaluation of the Rupee not only made manufactured 
goods more competitive but also encouraged the rise of the Indian service sector. India’s service 
sector experienced an astounding 85.3% increase in GDP share between 1974-1982 and 2001-
2010, a indicator of water’s increased importance. Within that sector, the most remarkable 
growth is in phone an internet related services which increased over 500% between 1980 and 
2010.38 
 
2.2.3: Today and Beyond 
The Indian government has experienced rapid economic growth for nearly three  
decades39 due in large part to its increased integration with the international market. Figure 2 
demonstrates the sharp rise in GDP per capita beginning in the mid 1990s. Prior to 1997, Indian 
GDP per capita remained fairly stable. The sharp increase in GDP per Capita can be largely 
attributed to the 1991 policy changes outlined above. While the changes in India’s GDP thus far 
are remarkable, they are far from over. Projections from PricewaterhouseCoopers Global’s 
(PwC) predict that India will become the world’s second largest economy, following China, by 
205040. 
                                            
37 Ibid. 
38 Kumar, U., & Subramanian, A. (2011). India’s Growth in the 2000s: Four Facts. Washington DC. 
39AQUASTAT Main Database, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 2016 
40 Audino, H., Clarry, R., & Hawksworth, J. (2017). The Long View How Will the Global Economic Order Change 
by 2050? London. Retrieved from www.pwc.com 
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Figure 2: GDP per Capita India 1977-2015  
Source: AQUASTAT Main Database, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 2016 
 
  
Similar to China, India’s population has rapidly grown since the 1970s. However, unlike 
China, India lacks the political capability to control its population to the same extent. Though the 
average fertility rate in India has decreased from 5.19 in 1975 to 2.32 in 2016, the Indian 
population is still expected to outgrow China’s by 202441,42. Figure 3 demonstrates India and 
China’s population convergence and India’s impending rise over China. Increases to overall 
average life expectancy globally makes the rapidly growing population of India ever more 
concerning.  
                                            
41 World Bank. "Fertility Rate, total (births per woman) India" World Development Indicators, The World Bank 
Group, 2017, data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC. 
42 Audino, H., Clarry, R., & Hawksworth, J. (2017). The Long View How Will the Global Economic Order Change 
by 2050? London. Retrieved from www.pwc.com 
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Figure 3: Total Population India vs China 1977-2015 
Source: AQUASTAT Main Database, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 2016 
 
In India, the proportion of the urban to rural population is also growing, similarly to 
China. But without a strict internal migration policy like China, India is plagued by massive slum 
development in their urban centers. India is also struggling with the same lack infrastructural 
development to mitigate the issues associated with rapid urbanization. These issues will only be 
exasperated in time as India’s urban population is projected to nearly double by 2050, with 400 
million rural migrants flooding to major cities43. 
 
III. Impact on Water and Energy Consumption 
 
3.1: The Water-Energy Nexus 
The obvious humanitarian and agricultural value of water cannot be understated nor 
neglected, but the importance of water to these two emerging powerhouses reaches much further. 
                                            
43 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2014). World Urbanization 
Prospects: The 2014 Revision, Highlights (ST/ESA/SER.A/352) 
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Both China and India heavily rely on water for energy production. As these countries continue to 
grow in terms of population and economy size, they will need more energy to ensure their 
prolonged success.  
The water energy nexus describes the intimate relationship between energy and water. A 
report from the Journal of Fundamentals of Renewable Energy and Applications explains,  
“Water is needed to generate energy. Energy is required to deliver, clean and evaporate 
water. Thus, there are extensive linkages between water and energy use. Meanwhile, both 
resources may limit the other, especially in the context of urbanization and industrialization 
as well as climate change”.44  
Water can be understood as a key input to all energy production such as hydropower, coal and 
natural gas. Regardless of the energy sources China and India will choose to pursue in the future, 
water will be needed for the energy production process. Water can is then a limiting factor to 
energy production and thus a developmental hazard for both states. The needs to produce energy 
is incentive for India and China to attempt to secure as much water as they can to ensure their 
growth. After establishing the inextricable relationship between the two, one can examine the 
potential hazards of the rapid development of these two massive states. 
 
3.2: Energy Demand Changes 
The development of India and China alike have altered their respective domestic energy 
demands. In order to sustain their development, both countries are reliant on their ability to 
continuously increase their energy production to meet demand.  
 
                                            
44 Yu Qiu, G., Li, W., Li, L., Zhang, Q., & Yang, Y. (2014). Water and Energy Nexus in China: Current Situation 
and Future Perspective in Energy Industry, Water Industry and Agriculture. https://doi.org/10.4172/2090-
4541.1000138 
 18 
3.2.1 China 
China’s energy needs have grown astronomically since in the late 1970s. Figure 4 
demonstrates that total production of energy has risen fairly uniformly long with GDP per 
Capita. The uniformity of the trend suggests that as a country’s economy grows, so does its 
energy demand. The basics of economies of scale explains that in order to increase returns to 
investment, total output must increase. In order to increase output, one must also increase total 
input. Energy is a key industrial input and its adequate access is crucial for the growth of the 
sector. Figure 5 demonstrates the astonishing rise in industrial energy demand beginning from 
the 1990s.  
 
Figure 4: Total Production of Energy x GDP per Capita China 1977-2015 
Source: 2018. China statistical yearbook. 
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Figure 5: Total Consumption of Energy by Sector China 1990-2015 
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2017 
 
 
While the industrial sector has most evidently experienced the sharpest changes in energy 
consumption, the energy consumption patterns demonstrated by Figure 5 of household and 
agriculture also point to some interesting trends. Though the population has grown, and the 
average diet has become more energy and water intensive with economic development,45 the 
amount of energy needed to fuel the agricultural sector has stayed fairly stagnant. Further, 
another interesting trend highlighted by Figure 5, is the rise in household consumption of energy. 
The increased amount of energy being used by municipalities could be interpreted as a symptom 
of urbanization pointing to a concerning trend between energy demands and urbanization. As 
China continues to urbanize, the increased energy need from individual municipal households 
will only continue to strain China’s energy resources.  
                                            
45 Pomeranz, K. (2013). Asia’s Unstable Water Tower: The Politics, Economics, and Ecology of Himalayan Water 
Projects. Asia Policy, 10(16), 4–10. https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2013.0023 
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Overall, the astonishing growth of energy consumption and production in China is cause for 
concern, especially when considering the sector-based demand changes. A major driver of the 
increased demand for energy has been the industrial sector; but increased household energy use 
is also cause for concern. Though China’s industries have largely matured and therefore are not 
expected to increase their energy demands at such an alarming rate, these trends point to a 
precarious future for China’s rapidly growing southern neighbor. 
 
3.2.2: India 
India, like China, has experienced a sharp rise in total energy demand coinciding with its 
rapid economic development. Figure 6 demonstrates that similar to China, energy consumption 
demand can be positively correlated with a rise in GDP per capita. Even with the high population 
growth the country has sustained in the last 30 years, the amount of electricity use per capita has 
sharply risen. This speaks to the severity of electric demand changes in the country brought 
about by its development. Not only does the country need more energy to simply sustain its 
growing population, but each individual in the population is consuming 550% more electricity in 
2015 as compared to 1975. 
When considering the path that China’s energy demands followed throughout its rapid 
economic development, the increasing need for electricity in India warns of a similar trend to be 
followed. As Indian cities continue to grow, the country will have to find ways to supply their 
urban centers with the energy they need.  
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Figure 6: GDP Per Capita x Electricity Consumption per Capita India 1977-2015 
Source: AQUASTAT Main Database, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 2016 
World Bank. India World Development Indicators, The World Bank Group, 2017 
 
 
3.3: Water Demand Changes 
3.3.1: China 
China’s development has evidently altered its energy needs. The increase in energy need 
coupled with the overall development of the public and private sphere of the country strains 
already scarce water resources. Economic development has only increased China’s total water 
and energy needs.  
Figure 7 demonstrates the close link between population growth and water needs. China’s 
population has grown by nearly 500 million people since 1975, and therefore an increased 
demand for water is logical. What this graph is unable to demonstrate, however, is how 
population growth itself is not the sole driver of increased water withdrawal. Figure 8 shows the 
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fairly constant water per capita availability in China between 1977 and 2015 and the decreasing 
need for water in agriculture. This signals that the increased demand for water is not solely 
attributed to sustention of food and water demands of the population, but also to support the 
demands of the ever-industrializing landscape. Recalling the energy-water nexus, one can 
understand that the increased demand for energy, driven by the rise of the industrial sector and 
growth of cities, has heavily impacted the water demands of the nation. 
Rises in municipal and industrial demand explain the consistency of the agricultural sector’s 
water demands. Figure 9 demonstrates the sector-based demand for water over time. While 
agricultural needs have slowly decreased, municipal and industrial demand has increased 
considerably. Industrial water needs increased nearly 300% in the last four decades. When 
considering the rise in industrial energy demand outlined in Figure 5, a sharp rise in industrial 
demand water demand is understandable. Similarly, China’s municipal water demand has also 
increased by an astonishing 1,173%. As outlined previously, China has rapidly urbanized since 
the late 1970s, the water demand generated from that rapid urbanization has impacted water 
demand. 
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Figure 7: Total Population x Total Water Withdrawal China 1975-2015 
Source: AQUASTAT Main Database, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 2016 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Agricultural Water Withdrawal vs Water Withdrawal per Capita China 1980-2015 
Source: AQUASTAT Main Database, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 2016 
 
 24 
 
Figure 9: Water Withdrawal by Sector China 1980-2015 
Source: AQUASTAT Main Database, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 2016 
 
3.3.2: India 
Considering the commonalities between India and China, the data depicting a sharp increase 
in water demand in China may be concerning considering India’s developmental trajectory. 
Figure 10 demonstrates that similarly to China, India’s change in total water withdrawal over 
time appears to be strongly correlated with the overall increase in population. Unlike China 
however, India’s rise in water demand is largely attributed to agricultural demand. This 
difference is understandable based on India’s developmental strategy. Whereas China largely 
benefited from the rise of their industrial sector, India developed its service sector instead. 
India’s problem distinguishes itself from that of China because the agricultural needs of the 
rapidly growing population is a main driver of increasing water demand. 
It should be noted, however, that these water data end in 2010, very close to India’s GDP 
boom. It may still be too soon to tell how much the industrial and municipal water demands will 
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change considering the massive increase in GDP between 2007 and 2015. This could explain the 
seemingly negligible rise in industrial and municipal water demand demonstrated in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 10: Total Population X Total Water Withdrawal India 1975-2015 
Source: AQUASTAT Main Database, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 2016 
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Figure 11: Sector Based Water Withdrawal 
Source: AQUASTAT Main Database, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 2016 
 
3.4 Increasing Water Scarcity in China 
China is already water scarce. The average water per capita availability is one-third of the 
world average and the available water flow per capita is second to India for the lowest in the 
world. 46 The already low amounts of water flowing in these countries is exacerbated by their 
growing populations and developmental needs.  
A key issue in China’s water scarcity is its uneven distribution. The vast majority of China’s 
water in located in the southwestern provinces but more than half of China’s population is 
located in the northeastern region of the country. The whole of northern China is categorized as 
water scarce, as it only houses 14% of Chinas available water sources.47 The northern and coastal 
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regions of China are booming urban economic zones, it is imperative for China to ensure 
sufficient water access in order to guarantee continued economic stability.  
China’s water scarcity issues are worsened by generally poor management. The CCP 
relaxed its centralized control over the Chinese state in order to allow the economy to grow. This 
disjointed management, however, makes creating and implementing policy difficult.48 Water is 
managed at three levels in China, each with their own interests in regard to water.49 The 
mismanagement of water and lack of consistency with policy information threatens the 
ecological viability and long-term sustainability of Chinese water courses. 
The issues of poor management and general scarcity are compounded with the lack of 
sufficient waste water treatment and pollution mitigation. SEPA reported that 70% of the water 
in 5 of the 7 major Chinese rivers are too polluted to be designated for beneficial use.50 
Approximately half of this pollution is due to agricultural runoff and pesticide use while the 
remaining portion is attributed to the growing volume of untreated municipal and industrial 
waste water.51  
Issues of water scarcity in China impact India directly because the two countries share 
multiple river courses. As China grows increasingly water stressed, it will have greater incentive 
to utilize its Southwestern water resources to its full capacity. China is also becoming 
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increasingly incentivized to pursue hydropower projects in order to support their massive, 
developing population.  
 
IV. Geopolitics of the Tibetan Plateau 
The last sections have worked to paint the current and projected hydro-political picture 
between India and China. While individually the water problems encountered by these countries 
are cause for concern, their compounding effect due to their geopolitics of the Tibetan Plateau 
make the issues ever-pressing. Previous studies have identified the role of the Tibetan Plateau as 
a potential political sore point for China and its neighbors but have neglected to critically assess 
the potential for conflict given the geopolitics of the plateau, growing demands of India and 
China and the increased impact of climate change. This section aims to demonstrate the 
importance of the Tibetan Plateau for future Sino-Indian relations given its direct impact on the 
developmental potential of both states. 
The Tibetan Plateau located in South Western China has been dubbed “Asia’s Water 
Tower” because ten of Asia’s most important rivers are headed in the region. The rivers flowing 
out of Tibet provide water for approximately 50% of the world’s population and account for 70% 
of total available water in Asia.52 Considering the immeasurable value of Tibet to China and all 
of its downstream neighbors, the growing regional anxieties are understandable.  
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 29 
 
Figure 12: Map of rivers flowing out of the Tibetan Plateau 
Source: meltdownintibet.com 
 
As China continues to struggle with chronic water shortages, the state may feel increasingly 
inclined to utilize the waters in Tibet. While the CCP has not signaled any impending action, 
rumors of a massive west to east river diversion project have been circulating for decades. 
Meanwhile, India’s growing population threatens its own domestic water security. The most 
important river shared by India and China, the Brahmaputra accounts for 30% of India’s 
available freshwater resources.53 
The rivers flowing out of Tibet are not only imperative to satiate the thirst needs of these 
countries, but also to generate hydropower for their rapidly developing economies. As outlined 
in previous sections, China and India’s total energy consumption has sky rocketed due to their 
economic development. While arguments can be made that China’s growing energy demands 
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may be slowing, India will only become increasingly energy hungry.54 The continued 
development of the Indian cities and economic industries are dependent upon the availability of 
hydropower. Conversely, China’s ability to maintain its title as the regional hegemon is also 
dependent on its adequate access to energy. The issues with hydropower are largely focused on 
one river: The Brahmaputra. 
The hydro-power potential of the rivers shared between India and China have led to 
anxieties in India’s political sphere. The Brahmaputra accounts for about 40% of India’s hydro-
power potential.55 The inability to secure that energy directly threatens India’s economic 
security. Further, if China were to pursue a project on the Brahmaputra that would disrupt 
waterflow to India, the results could be detrimental. With the phasing out of fossil fuels, China’s 
incentive and capability to pursue major water projects in Tibet grows and so does India’s 
anxiety.  
Countries have found ways to share water in the past to ensure mutual benefit. Even within 
the region, the Mekong River Treaty and Indus Valley Treaty are examples of codified 
agreements that adequately allocate water. China’s management of the Tibetan Plateau 
challenges multilateral cooperation because of the state’s general unwillingness to establish any 
type of water-sharing agreement. China is not a signatory to any water treaty and has not secured 
any outflowing water through any other type of arrangement.56 
India’s growing anxiety over China’s hydraulic plans is understandable. As the two largest 
and fastest growing economies in Asia, India and China have incentive to suppress one another’s 
potential growth. The countries also have a history of dispute over the valuable region. 
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Occupation of Southern Tibet has been disputed by India and China since the mid twentieth 
century.57 Further, China and India’s growing inclination to utilize a “plan/neglect/rebuild”58 
strategy for massive water projects is making water sharing a zero-sum issue.59 Rather than 
focusing on small-scale, sustainable projects or attempting to improve existing infrastructure, 
both states are pursuing new massive, complicated hydraulic projects that demonstrate a desire to 
capture as much of the resources available to them as possible. This signals that the waters in 
Tibet are not being regarded as a shared resource and furthers the “every man for himself” 
mentality of this hydro-political relationship 
China has increasingly relied upon the energy potential of Tibet; Figure 13 demonstrates the 
growing investment in rural hydropower projects as energy demands have increased by 
highlighting the increased hydropower and minority energy capacities. China’s utilization of 
these rivers is necessary to sustain their growing cities and industry but causes anxieties 
downstream. The anxiety is rooted in India’s need sustain its growth via the maximization of the 
Brahmaputra’s hydraulic potential. Considering their similar development trajectory, increased 
Indian investment in hydropower projects could be predicted. Thus, India has increasing 
incentive to grow anxious over China’s pursuit of hydropower and may become increasingly 
defensive over the Brahmaputra. 
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Figure 13: Total Hydropower Capacity vs Total Electricity Produced in Minority Areas China 1985-2017 
Source: 2018. China statistical yearbook. 
 
V. Potential for Conflict vs Cooperation 
The prevailing issues in the Tibet caused by India and China’s export-oriented economic 
growth has been a hot topic for debate among scholars. The problems associated with the water 
problems of India and China are not only a matter of public health, but national security. Some 
scholars like Dr. Brahma Chellaney and Dr. Elizabeth Economy have supported the “water wars” 
narrative for the Sino-Indian relationship that hypothesizes future conflicts will be based on 
irreconcilable water disputes. Others, like the Chinese Ministry of Water, have discounted the 
issue entirely. This paper aims to analyze the potential for conflict based on Fearon’s rationalist 
explanations for war.60  
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In his paper, Fearon asserts that states are rational actors and therefore must have rational 
reasons to engage in harmful conflicts. This assumption implies that “states should have 
incentive to locate negotiated settlements” rather than engage in risky and costly warfare.61 
Therefore, states must have sound, rational reasons that make the pursuit diplomatic routes 
unfavorable. Fearon outlines three key reasons negotiated agreements fail and violent conflicts 
ensue: (1) Incomplete information between the belligerents (2) commitment problems that 
obstruct the bilateral trust and (3) the indivisibility of the object or issue in question.62  
Based on Fearon’s argument, this paper posits that the potential for war is rooted in lack of 
accurate information sharing as well as commitment problems rooted in the indivisible nature of 
Tibet. The lack of sufficient information largely lies in the mixed signals given by both India and 
China and overall secrecy of the Chinese state. Both countries have incentives to misrepresent 
their water demands as well as their willingness to fight for access. The countries also face a 
more difficult commitment problem which is rooted in two key issues: 1) the changing water 
demands of India and China make any long-term arrangement nearly impossible to configure and 
2) the indivisibility of the Tibet Plateau.  
This section aims to analyze potential for both conflict and cooperation, first by outlining 
how these issues could lead to armed conflict if not mitigated and later offering suggestions for 
the possible de-escalation. 
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5.1: Potential for Conflict 
India and China have a history of aggression in the Tibetan Region and tensions have only 
grown in recent years. China and India both claim ownership of Southern Tibet and have gone to 
war for the territory as recently as the mid 20th century.63 As recent as 2017 Chinese and India 
troops had a standoff in Doklam, a disputed border area in Southwest China.  
India and China alike have demonstrated their willingness to fight for the Tibetan Plateau 
and preserve their access to its comprehensibly valuable resources. This section aims to analyze 
how the dependency on the resources of the plateau may transpire into an armed international 
conflict. 
 
5.1.1: Incomplete Information 
One of the major forces that have consistently increased the tensions between India and is 
the overall lack of accurate signaling and information sharing in regard to their military 
capabilities, willingness to fight and projected water demand. Fearon identifies this issue as 
significant because it obstructs accurate communication between two states. One state cannot 
accurately determine the best course of action without full knowledge of the situation. This paper 
will focus on the aspect of willingness to fight as it largely plays into the accepted strategic and 
economic value of the Tibetan Plateau and I extend Fearon’s idea to explain why China and 
India may be incentivized to misrepresent their potential water demand and under-share 
hydraulic information.  
India has demonstrated not only its willingness, but its enthusiasm to challenge Chinese 
power in the region. In regard to China and India’s bilateral relationship, India has signaled that 
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it is growing concerned over upstream dam construction by the Chinese that may impact 
downstream flow.64 Numerous Indian officials have vocalized their concern over the issue and 
called for a codified resolution to ease anxieties. Undoubtedly, India has made it abundantly 
clear that the waters of the Tibetan Plateau are a point of contention in their relationship with 
China. Their recent standoff in Doklam signals their willingness to challenge their regional 
competitor militarily.  
The aggressive nature of Indian signaling may not necessarily mean that they are willing to 
fight for the plateau, but instead may be a security measure to deter China from pursuing any 
harmful projects. India’s role of the watch dog forces China to more carefully consider the 
actions they take in regard to their shared waters. Without any official agreement between the 
countries, India’s over-vigilance is the only security measure that can exist. With this in mind, 
China is then incentivized to keep the established status quo because India has signaled its 
willingness to go to war if it is challenged.  
India’s blatant aggression can also be viewed as a bargaining strategy. By stating the value 
of the Brahmaputra vis-a-vis political signaling, India may be able to obtain a more favorable 
resolution in the case of an official agreement. India has posited the waters of the Brahmaputra 
as a liability for their relationship with China. If China wants to avoid a water-war, they will 
have to acknowledge the value of the Brahmaputra to India. 
Alternatively, China has been far less vocal about the issues in the region. The Chinese 
government has repeatedly stated is has no intention of disrupting the flow of the Brahmaputra. 
In fact, many Chinese scholars and government officials have even accused India of overstating 
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the issue.65 As stated above, India may have incentive to overstate the value of Tibet and their 
willingness to fight in order to capture better terms on a potential agreement. Following similar 
logic however, China also has incentive to understate their position in order to continue with 
their own agenda without the political oversight. If China sends no signals about future plans, 
those future plans are much more difficult to obstruct. Further, concealing the value China places 
on the Brahmaputra allows China to avoid appearing like the aggressor. If China can appear 
composed and egalitarian, other countries would have less reason to challenge their upstream 
authority. 
China however has not only concealed the value placed on the Brahmaputra, but their 
overall need for water as a country as well. China will face continued water shortages in the near 
future that may incentive it to utilize the resources in Tibet. Therefore, China has incentive to 
hide their water needs from other countries to avoid any objections to future projects. China’s 
secrecy and overall lack of cooperation has been demonstrated numerous times. Most notably, 
China’s unwillingness to enter into any water sharing treaty signals that it is not interested in 
codifying long-term agreements when domestic and international circumstances are very likely 
to change. Further, China has been secretive with water data sharing in recent years. In 2017 
China refused to send water data to India, a signal that was poorly received by Indian officials.66 
 China and India both have ample incentives to overstate and/or conceal their intentions 
over the Tibetan Plateau. But the lack of good and clear communication may only be escalating 
the situation and could continue to taint the trust between the two nations.  
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5.1.2: Commitment Problems 
Coupled with issues of incomplete information is the overarching inability to commit to any 
type of resolution for the problem. Commitment problems are rooted in structural reasons that 
prevent states from trusting one another.67 The lack of accurate information sharing between the 
two states largely breeds these commitment problems. Without accurate knowledge of the 
opponent’s willingness to fight and value of the disputed territory, no resolution can ensure long-
term peace. Further, a resolution seems near impossible due to the rapidly changing water needs 
of both countries. Fearon hypothesizes that commitment problems largely arise when a deal may 
be viable now but will no longer be in the future. As India and China both continue to grow, their 
needs will change. If the circumstances of an established deal are to change, both states will have 
incentive to violate the terms of the deal and act autonomously.  
Aside from inaccurate information, the commitment problems rely heavily on the 
indivisible nature of Tibet given its immense strategic value. Fearon analyzes the problems 
associated with disputes over mutually strategic territories by stating “[…] both sides might 
prefer some package of territorial concessions to a fight, but if the territory in question is 
strategically vital or economically important, its transfer could radically increase one side's 
future bargaining leverage”.68 The Tibetan Plateau is an economic hub for both China and India 
that directly determines their future economic and political power. It not only ensures their 
national public health but also fuels their development and provides the energy needed to sustain 
their massive cities. Thus, whichever entity is in control of the plateau benefits from the gains to 
regional political power its carries. Loss of control over this area would heavily impact China’s 
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regional power and therefore causes the hawkish strategy for its management. India, conversely, 
would gain immeasurable regional power if the result of an armed conflict meant it would gain 
ownership over Tibet. Based on Fearon’s framework, the potential loss to Chinese power with 
the potential gain to Indian power makes both countries extremely willing to fight over the issue. 
 Water is a zero-sum resource that it is not only finite but has immeasurable economic 
value. Any water conceded to India directly impact’s China’s developmental potential and vice 
versa. Thus, China will always have incentive to act in its own interest even if that involves 
violating a codified agreement and India will always have incentive to challenge China’s hold 
over the plateau and violate an agreement in the hopes of gaining more resources. 
 
5.2: Cooperation 
While prospects for conflict may seem grim, certain countermeasures can be taken to 
decrease the likelihood of escalation. The potential for cooperation versus conflict lies in the 
ability of a potential solution to resolve the issues of incomplete information and commitment 
problems.  
 
5.2.1: Incomplete Information 
One measure to counter issues of misrepresentation is increased data sharing between the 
two states. China has not voluntarily offered its hydro-data to its neighbors but has agreed to sell 
the data to some of its neighbors.69 Though not ideal, the potential for a business-like exchange 
of data information between India and China could aid in the trustbuilding process. A mutually 
beneficial cash transfer for data will ensure reciprocity between the states and provides incentive 
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to cooperate. This would involve China and India setting annual prices for their hydraulic data 
through the mediation of an international institute. Both countries have incentive to purchase the 
other’s data because it is pertinent to their long-term political and economic success. The 
countries could also arrange an advisory committee, like that of the Indus Valley Agreement, to 
meet annually to exchange data and discuss its implications. An agreement of this nature maybe 
better suited for the time being because no water use concessions are required.  
It is imperative that the states address their issues of misinformation before they can draft 
long-term, sustainable water treaties. India may continue with less anxiety about China’s 
intentions and alternatively China can better account for their domestic needs and regional 
impact. A bilateral data agreement, brokered by an international institution like the World Bank, 
would be a meaningful first step to transparency and cooperation.  
 
5.2.2: Commitment Problems 
Water is zero-sum but not indivisible. There are ways to equitably divide the resources so 
that both countries can use them sustainably. Some countries in the region have already drafted 
their own bilateral and multilateral treaties. Political adversaries India and Pakistan have had a 
long-standing water sharing agreement in the Indus Valley. Other countries like Cambodia, Laos, 
Thailand and Vietnam have drafted their own successful multilateral treaty to share the Mekong. 
In an ideal world, India and China would overcome their differences and draft their own 
water sharing treaty but unfortunately the contentious nature of their relationship, as outlined 
throughout this paper, prevents that from happening. Additionally, China has only signaled 
disinterest in regard to a water-sharing treaty with any country.  
Another unlikely but useful solution would involve dual investment by China and India in 
shared water projects along the Brahmaputra. A dam placed up stream has far more hydraulic 
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potential than a dam placed downstream.70 China thus has the greatest hydropower potential of 
all the states in the region. Therefore, if China and India could pursue a joint project further 
upstream on the Brahmaputra, both countries would capture the hydropower potential while still 
ensuring each other’s sustainable development. Similar to a water sharing treaty, a joint-
hydraulic project would be ideal but nonetheless unlikely. As stated, China and India have 
chosen to pursue a “plan/neglect/rebuild” strategy for hydraulic development that perpetuates a 
generally uncooperative relationship between the two states. Further the issue of trust between 
the two states makes this plan risky for both states. Because a joint project will likely be in 
China, India cannot be sure that they will receive the benefits of the project. China may instead 
simply agree to a shared project in order to capitalize on the hydraulic potential and go on to 
claim the project for itself. 
An alternative, more plausible solution is to increase water conservation and efficiency 
domestically in both states. If water is not able to be equitably divided, it should be most 
efficiently consumed. Pomeranz suggests that both countries cut water use in their agricultural 
sector, the thirstiest sector in both states. He suggests that increased sharing of water saving 
technologies between the two states is a good basis for cooperation that would provide both 
countries with the economic incentives they need to share technologies.71 This, like a data-only 
treaty, could act as a trust-building proxy in place of a comprehensive water sharing treaty.  
Increased water treatment in both countries would be a meaningful step to ensure maximum 
water efficiency and combat the widespread polluting of freshwater sources. In China’s case, 
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though almost all municipal waste water is treated,72 almost 30% of China’s rivers were polluted 
beyond any functional use in 2006.73 Most of this pollution is caused by agricultural and 
livestock runoff.74 The remainder of the pollution is largely caused by untreated or poorly treated 
municipal and industrial wastewater and runoff in major cities.75 Further, China receives a low 
water efficiency score as compared to other middle-income countries.76 An effort by the Chinese 
state to clean up polluted water sources and improve overall water efficiency and treatment could 
help mitigate the economic losses caused by water scarcity.  
India similarly struggles with a water pollution problem. Unlike China, however, India does 
not yet have the economic or technological tools needed to mitigate the issues. Currently, only 
28% of India’s municipal waste water is treated, the remaining 72% is returned to domestic 
water sources untreated. This not only causes grave health conditions like typhoid and diarrhea 
that result in economic losses to the state, but it also decreases the amount of available water for 
drinking, industrial and agricultural use. Efforts have been made to clean some of these rivers, 
such as the 3-billion-dollar initiative led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to clean the Ganges, 
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but are still ultimately insufficient.77 The Indian and Chinese states alike must focus their energy 
and resources on improving the efficiency and quality of their own domestic resources before 
pursuing major hydropower projects or squabbling for additional water use rights.  
Along the same lines, a concerted effort by India and China to mitigate their domestic 
energy use would decrease the overall need for water. Some key changes both countries could 
undertake are small changes in household demand. This would include a campaign to switch to 
more energy efficient lightbulbs or decreasing ownership of personal washer and dryer machines 
as well as other energy intensive personal technologies.78  
In short, both countries must focus on their own sustainable development by planning for 
future urban and industrial growth. In China, the CCP should make a concerted effort to balance 
out the uneven domestic population distribution. Over 60% of China’s massive population is 
located in the Northern region of the country which only houses 14% of freshwater resources.79 
The North also dominates China’s agricultural production, contributing further to the illogical 
distribution in China. The immense effort to irrigate and supply water to the barren area should 
be redirected to growing southern cities and agricultural production facilities that are located 
more closely to China’s water supply. 
In India’s case, much of the irrigation schemes in place are relics from the partition of India 
and Pakistan in 1947 and do not actually efficiently allocate the water modern India needs. The 
irrigation systems established by the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan did not 
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account for the massive Indian demand growth and has thus become antiquated.80 India should 
focus not only on increasing water treatment but also on improving the existing irrigation 
infrastructure and modernizing the existing treaties to adequately meet the state’s changing 
demands. 
Overall, there are advantages associated with cooperation for both China and India. Though 
the prospect of a comprehensive water allocating agreement is still rather far-fetched, both 
countries have incentive to create deals to exchange hydraulic data as well as water saving 
technologies. Further, a future shared water project along the Brahmaputra between India and 
China would allow both states to capitalize on the hydraulic potential of the river without 
threatening the others growth. For now, however, both countries should focus on their own 
domestic water and energy efficiency in order to maximize the water the currently have available 
to them and mitigate future water stress ad scarcity.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
The ongoing problems of the Sino-Indian hydro-political relationship have become a point 
of international concern. These issues are part of a greater global water crisis that is increasing 
the potential for water-based conflict. Some academics and politicians have predicted “water 
wars” between water sharing nations for access to limited water81,82. China and India’s problems 
are of particular concern because of the huge populations and economies of both countries. 
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Conflict in the Tibetan Plateau then is a direct threat to Sino-Indian global public and economic 
health.  
Both India and China have large stakes in this conflict and ultimately have incentive to 
cooperate rather than fight for a solution. Cooperation is more advantageous for both countries 
economically, politically and socially. The costs to an armed conflict by Asia’s superpowers are 
extremely high, especially if a loss on the battlefield equates to a loss of water access. An 
escalation to war would only encourage the zero-sum perspective on water and worsen the 
already adversarial relationship between India and China. Consequently, the only way to ensure 
cooperation to begin mending that adversarial relationship. By using trust-building measures and 
focusing on domestic water consumptions, both countries can signal that they intend to cooperate 
to create sustainable solutions for all. Ultimately, a cooperative and equitable outcome is most 
ideal for China and India alike and gives hope to the prospect of finding a long-term solution to 
the issue. 
While water is a major point of contention between India and China, it is not the only sore-
point in the bilateral relationship. If an armed conflict was to break out between the two 
countries, the water issue between China and India could be operationalized to encourage a war 
but it would not be the sole issue. Thus, the concept of “water wars” in itself may be 
shortsighted, at least in the Sino-Indian case. Water is only one of a number of major issues 
between the countries that is impacting their political relationship. As India and China compete 
for power in the region, they may have greater incentive to participate in armed conflict to ensure 
their long-term economic and political hold in the region. Water can then be considered to be a 
major reason for escalation to war but cannot be regarded as the sole driver of conflict.  
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Though conflict versus cooperation has been represented as a binary, there is a third option: 
inaction. Inaction may be the most likely outcome of this dispute, at least for now. The two 
countries can focus on water and energy use domestically to avoid the need to codify a 
cooperative agreement. China and India’s ability to control their domestic water and energy 
efficiency will have a substantial impact on their developmental potential, irrespective of the 
overall access to water resources. Neither country can continue to grow if they do not ensure 
sustainable consumption practices within their borders. Perhaps the best choice for the time 
being is to suspend bilateral action and focus on individual domestic changes to mitigate future 
scarcity issues. Both countries will benefit from controlling their internal water and energy 
demands because, as stated, water is zero-sum in nature. Water’s finite quality creates incentive 
to maximize efficiency, a goal that should precede maximizing access.  
The emerging water related issues between India and China also point to future issues China 
may encounter with other downstream neighbors like Vietnam and Thailand as the countries also 
begin to develop economically. As the region as a whole increases their economic output and 
populations, meaningful solutions that include China will become increasingly necessary to 
ensure continued regional growth. China and India may be able to avoid a codified agreement 
and armed conflict for now through domestic actions, but those actions will only work to 
deescalate the problem, not solve it. Ultimately, China and India’s water problems signal to a 
growing global water scarcity problem. How that problem will play out in the global arena will 
be determined by the ability of countries to deescalate the situations before they become violent. 
